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IS THE CHINESE EXCLUSION CASE STILL 
GOOD LAW? (THE PRESIDENT IS TRYING 
TO FIND OUT) 
Michael Kagan* 
Though barely mentioned in the early court filings, the lurking issue in 
the constitutional challenges to President Trump’s immigration bans—
what opponents call the “Muslim ban”—is whether the 1889 Chinese 
Exclusion Case can still guide immigration law in the twenty-first centu-
ry. The facts of the Chinese Exclusion Case are remarkably similar to 
the present litigation, and yet defenders of the President’s policies have 
been notably reluctant to discuss the case.  
INTRODUCTION 
A spectre haunts the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) arguments in the 
cases challenging President Donald Trump’s executive orders banning immi-
gration from a list of Muslim countries.1 It is the spectre of the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case,2 an 1889 decision that so closely parallels the present case that fail-
ing to mention it seems like a form of malpractice. The holding of the decision 
squarely favors the Trump Administration. Moreover, as professors of immi-
gration law tell their students semester after semester, the Chinese Exclusion 
Case has never been overruled. And yet, when the first version of the travel ban 
was enjoined, the Department of Justice failed to mention the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case in its filings to the District Court and in its emergency appeal to the 
                                                        
*  Michael Kagan (B.A. Northwestern, J.D. University of Michigan) is Professor of Law at 
the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law. I am grateful for 
comments received from Ian Bartrum, Seth Galanter, and Stephen Legomsky; all errors are 
mine. 
1  Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter First Executive 
Order]; Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Second 
Executive Order]. 
2  Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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Ninth Circuit.3 Nor is it mentioned in the government’s appeal to the Fourth 
Circuit against the enjoining of President Trump’s second travel ban.4  
Consider the basic facts of the Chinese Exclusion Case: 
1.   A blanket ban on immigration based on nationality. 
2.   Apparent animus as a motivation for the ban. 
3.   Refusal to allow re-entry even for legal residents.  
President Trump’s First Executive Order, as described in the Complaint 
filed by the State of Washington, contained all three of these features.5 In the 
1889 case, the ban was imposed by Congress, while the Trump ban was enact-
ed by the President. But this may count for little. President Trump relied on a 
congressionally-enacted measure allowing the President to exclude a “class” of 
non-citizens.6 After the First Executive Order was enjoined by the courts, the 
second version exempted current legal residents and visa holders.7 Opponents 
continued to argue that the travel ban reflected anti-Muslim animus.8  
 The DOJ’s evident reluctance to mention a case so substantively on point 
seems to suggest several possible things. First, to explicitly analogize Trump’s 
policies to the openly racist Chinese Exclusion Act would be politically embar-
rassing, and might appear to concede that animus was the motivation for the 
Executive Orders. Second, the DOJ may believe that the Chinese Exclusion 
Case is not actually good law. Or, to put this another way, the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case may be slipping into the anti-canon—a category of decisions that are 
understood to be un-citable as precedent, and relevant to courts only as a warn-
ing.9  
                                                        
3  Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Washington v. Trump, 
No. 17–35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 492504. Nor, for that matter, did the brief 
amicus curiae filed by the State of Texas urging the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc 
make any mention of the Chinese Exclusion Case. Motion for Leave to File Brief for State of 
Texas as Amicus Curiae in Support of Rehearing En Banc, Washington v. Trump, No. 17–
35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2017), 2017 WL 729939. 
4  Brief for Appellants, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. 17-1351 (4th Cir. 
Mar. 24, 2017), ECF No. 36. 
5  See First Executive Order, supra note 1; Complaint at 6–8, 9, Washington v. Trump, No. 
2:17–CV–00141–JLR (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 30, 2017), 2017 WL 443297 (alleging ani-
mus). 
6  8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a) (2012). 
7  See Second Executive Order, supra note 1, at § 3 (exempting legal permanent residents 
and holders of valid visas). 
8  Response to Defendant’s Notice of Filing of Exec. Order at 14, Washington v. Trump, No. 
2:17–CV–00141–JLR (W.D. Wash. filed Mar. 9, 2017), http://agportal-s3bucket.s3.amazon 
aws.com/uploadedfiles/Another/News/Press_Releases/Response%20to%20Notice%20of%2
0EO%2003-09-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLY5-C29Q] (“[T]he Second Executive Order 
are materially indistinguishable from provisions this Court already enjoined, and are moti-
vated by the same religious animus as the First Executive Order.”). 
9  See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 385–86 (2011) (defining the 
anticanon); Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 329 (2010) (defining an anticanonical text and the inverse of a ca-
nonical one, which serves as a marker for widely accepted, or widely disapproved, ideas). 
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To this end, it is worth mentioning that opponents of the Trump policies 
have been more willing than DOJ to call attention to the Chinese Exclusion 
Case. In seeking an injunction against the first travel ban, the Attorney General 
of Washington told the district court that the 1889 decision was a relic of a big-
oted past, an episode to be learned from rather than a precedent to be fol-
lowed.10 I quote the reference in its entirety, to capture the tone of how the case 
was discussed: 
Accepting the President’s approach would take us back to a period in our history 
when distinctions based on national origin were accepted as the natural order of 
things, rather than outlawed as the pernicious discrimination that they are. Cf. 
Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 595, 606 (1889) (sustaining the Chinese 
Exclusion Act because the Chinese “remained strangers in the land,” constituted 
a “great danger [to the country]” unless “prompt action was taken to restrict their 
immigration,” and were “dangerous to [the country's] peace and security”).11 
But if the Chinese Exclusion Case has become the kind of decision that no 
longer stands for its facial holding and can be mentioned mainly to caution a 
court to not repeat a historic mistake, it is still quite unclear what remains of the 
plenary power doctrine to which the case is understood to have given birth. Is it 
possible that the Chinese Exclusion Case is anti-canon, and yet plenary power 
might remain relevant, at least in some situations? 
 In this Essay, I want to make the argument that the validity of the Chinese 
Exclusion Case is the central question in the challenges to President Trump’s 
travel bans. The facts are closely analogous. Moreover, the Chinese Exclusion 
Case is the seminal, canonical decision establishing vast federal power over 
immigration control. Resolving the present challenges to the Trump Executive 
Orders requires us to determine, once and for all, if that 1889 decision was 
rightly decided. But if that case cannot survive given what we know of consti-
tutional law in the twenty first century, we must be precise about what exactly 
the Court got wrong 128 years ago.  
I.   THE EXCLUSION OF CHAE CHAN PING 
The Chinese Exclusion Case—a.k.a. Chae Chan Ping v. United States – is 
the kind of canonical (or anti-canonical?) Supreme Court decision for which 
the specific facts and holding fade into the background in favor of the meaning 
that judges and lawyers come to ascribe to it over time.12 But given the factual 
                                                        
10  See Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Pre-
diction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000) (arguing that the Court’s early, expansive descriptions of federal 
immigration authority were exaggerated because they came in cases affirming racially dis-
criminatory laws during a time when the Court also upheld racist laws directed at citizens). 
11  Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 20–21, Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17–CV–
00141–JLR (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 30, 2017), 2017 WL 511013. 
12  See Bartrum, supra note 9, at 329 (“[A] canonical text takes on its own metonymic mean-
ings-sometimes quite apart from its literal textual meaning-within the practice of constitu-
tional law.”). 
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similarities with President Trump’s policies, we need to return to fundamentals. 
What was the actual dispute, and what did the Supreme Court actually say? 
Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese man who settled in San Francisco in 
1875.13 He had the misfortune to arrive in the United States during a period of 
intense anti-Chinese xenophobia. In 1882, Congress enacted the Chinese Ex-
clusion Act, prohibiting new Chinese immigrants from arriving, but not expel-
ling those already here—essentially a policy analogous to Trump’s Second Ex-
ecutive Order.14 In 1887, Mr. Chae decided to make a temporary visit to China, 
with every intention of returning to his home in San Francisco.15 Following the 
procedure established by Congress at the time of his departure, he requested 
and received a certificate from the federal government entitling him to return.16 
On September 7, 1888, after his visit to China, he left Hong Kong on a 
steamship called the Belgic, carrying his U.S. return certificate.17 But on Octo-
ber 1, 1888, Congress passed a new law, which contained some very bad news 
for Mr. Chae: “[I]t shall be unlawful for any Chinese laborer . . . who shall have 
departed . . . and who shall not have returned before the passage of this act, to 
return to or remain in the United States.”18 
This 1888 policy is a close analogue to Trump’s First Executive Order. 
When Congress passed this new provision, Mr. Chae was already at sea, slowly 
making his way back to San Francisco. It would be another eleven years before 
Guglielmo Marconi tested the first shore-to-ship wireless telegraph, so it seems 
safe to assume that Mr. Chae spent his time in transit having absolutely no idea 
that the United States might not welcome him home. The Belgic arrived in San 
Francisco on October 8, 1888, which for Mr. Chae was eight days too late.19 
Following the new statute, the official in charge of the port of San Francisco 
refused to honor Mr. Chae’s year-old re-entry certificate.20 Prohibited from dis-
embarking, Mr. Chae found himself detained on board the boat that brought 
him.21  
 Mr. Chae pursued a doomed legal struggle all the way to the Supreme 
Court.22 The case presented the Court with a novel question: Could Congress 
enact an immigrant exclusion law? Although the Constitution gives Congress 
the enumerated authority to enact laws regulating naturalization, it actually 
                                                        
13  Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889). 
14  Id. at 597. 
15  Id. at 582. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. at 599. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  The case involved many legal claims, only some of which matter for present purposes. 
For instance, the Court first considered whether the statute could be invalidated by a bilateral 
treaty with China, which I will not explore here. Id. at 589, 600–03. 
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does not say anything explicitly about immigration laws, or laws regulating the 
mere entry of foreigners. The Court answered this with an emphatic “yes.” It 
cited federal power over foreign relations and commerce,23 and went on at 
greater length about the importance of immigration control to national sover-
eignty: “Jurisdiction over its own territory. . . is an incident of every independ-
ent nation. It is a part of its independence. . . . The power is constantly exer-
cised; its existence is involved in the right of self-preservation.”24 This aspect 
of the Court’s holding means only that Congress has the power to enact re-
strictions on immigration. This clearly remains good law today.25 Moreover, the 
Court acknowledged, at least in passing, that sovereign powers are still restrict-
ed by the Constitution.26 The decisive question should have been whether the 
Chinese Exclusion Act, and its particular application to Mr. Chae, was con-
sistent with the Constitution. 
The Court in Chae Chan Ping gave these questions relatively little atten-
tion. It never considered the possibility that excluding all Chinese people be-
cause of rampant anti-Chinese racism might pose a problem under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Raising such a claim for a Chinese man would have posed a 
doctrinal challenge, since at the time the Court was of the opinion that the 
“main purpose of [the Fourteenth Amendment] was the freedom of the African 
race.”27 Moreover, the Court did not apply the Equal Protection Clause to the 
federal government until the twentieth century.28 But focusing on doctrine 
probably misses the point. The Supreme Court decision itself is evidence of 
how mainstream anti-Chinese animus was at the time, repeating the popular 
paranoia that America would be “overrun” by the Chinese.29  
The Court only briefly considered the possibility that even if a general 
Chinese exclusion were permissible, Mr. Chae’s individual rights were violated 
because he had been a legal resident of the U.S., and had a permit promising to 
let him re-enter. The Court said that this is a question for the political branches 
                                                        
23  Id. at 629. 
24  Id. at 603–04, 608. 
25  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (“The Government of the 
United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of 
aliens.”). 
26  Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604 (“The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress 
insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to 
the states, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, re-
stricted in their exercise only by the constitution itself . . .”). 
27  The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 37 (1872). 
28  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (finding reverse incorporation of equal protec-
tion through the Fifth Amendment). 
29  Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 595 (“The competition between them and our people was 
for this reason altogether in their favor, and the consequent irritation, proportionately deep 
and bitter, was followed, in many cases, by open conflicts, to the great disturbance of the 
public peace. The differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.”). 
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of government, not the judiciary.30 Moreover, the Court framed the question en-
tirely as a matter of foreign relations, so that only the government of China 
might plausibly pose a complaint, not Mr. Chae as an individual.31 
 The Court’s emphatic endorsement of federal authority over immigration, 
coupled with its reluctance to seriously consider constitutional limitations on 
that authority, established the basic parameters for immigration law for more 
than a century.32 Despite blistering criticism, the plenary power doctrine en-
dured largely intact through the end of the twentieth century.33 This doctrine 
has seemed less robust in the twenty-first century—though it remains quite dif-
ficult to define exactly where it stands.34 Donald Trump assumed the presiden-
cy in the midst of this constitutional ambiguity. 
II.   ADDRESSING THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 
Mr. Chae’s ordeal developed slowly on board a nineteenth century steam-
ship crossing the Pacific. It was re-enacted at higher speed in January 2017 
when legal residents and visa holders were stranded and detained at airports 
around the world.35 A legal permanent resident who lived with her fiancée in 
Grand Rapids, Michigan was stranded in Iran after she had gone to visit her 
family there.36 A medical resident from Chicago was prevented from returning 
after he had left the country to get married.37 A producer for CNN, a legal per-
                                                        
30  Id. at 609 (“Whatever license, therefore, Chinese laborers may have obtained, previous to 
the act of October 1, 1888, to return to the United States after their departure, is held at the 
will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure. Whether a proper considera-
tion by our government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose sub-
jects are affected by its action, ought to have qualified its inhibition, and made it applicable 
only to persons departing from the country after the passage of the act, are not questions for 
judicial determination.”). 
31  Id. (“If there be any just ground of complaint on the part of China, it must be made to the 
political department of our government.”). 
32  See Stephen Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional 
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1984) (defining the concept and evolution of plenary pow-
er); see also Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 
GEO. L.J. 125, 135–37 (2015) (tracing the evolution of the doctrine to the present). 
33  See Stephen Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and 
the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995). 
34  See Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21 (2015). 
35  See Dan Merica, How Trump's Travel Ban Affects Green Card Holders and Dual Citi-
zens, CNN.COM (Jan. 29, 2017, 8:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/donald-
trump-travel-ban-green-card-dual-citizens/index.html [https://perma.cc/8VFV-GTPS]. 
36  Doug Reardon, Travel Ban: Local Man’s Fiancée Stranded in Iran, FOX 17 (Jan. 30, 
2017, 7:29 AM), http://fox17online.com/2017/01/29/travel-ban-local-mans-fiancee-stranded-
in-iran/ [https://perma.cc/HDQ7-TCQW]. 
37  Jason Meisner, 2 Stranded Overseas by Trump Travel Ban Allowed to Return to Chicago, 
CHICAGO TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2017, 5:20 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/break 
ing/ct-trump-immigration-ban-court-met-20170201-story.html [https://perma.cc/VVE7-TBU 
F]. 
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manent resident, was detained at the Atlanta airport while trying to return 
home.38 Up to thirteen people were detained at the Seattle-Tacoma International 
Airport.39 The government eventually said that 746 people, including legal resi-
dents, were detained at U.S. ports after the initial ban went into effect before it 
was enjoined by the courts; opponents of the ban said the real number was 
higher.40 
Despite the reluctance of the parties and courts to address it head on, much 
depends on whether we think the Chinese Exclusion Case was rightly decided. 
If it was rightly decided, then it would seem that Trump’s immigration bans are 
probably constitutional. If it was wrongly decided, it is important to explain 
precisely what is wrong with it. If the Chinese Exclusion Act was invalid be-
cause it was motivated by impermissible animus, then the Trump bans—
including the Second Executive Order—are probably invalid as well. If the 
Chinese Exclusion Act was substantively valid, but if Mr. Chae was individual-
ly entitled to return to the U.S., then it would seem that Trump’s first ban was 
invalid (because it excluded legal immigrants from returning to the country), 
but the second ban would be permissible (because it applies only to new appli-
cants for admission).  
 The individualized claim for legal residents and visa holders is the most 
straightforward under existing precedents. As the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit found in upholding the injunction against the First Executive Or-
der, there is ample Supreme Court authority for the rule that non-citizens in the 
U.S. have procedural due process rights.41 In particular, in the 1963 decision 
Rosenberg v. Fleuti, the Court held that returning legal residents have a right to 
a hearing before they are excluded from re-entering the country.42  A blanket 
ban based on nationality deprives people of this procedural right.43 Thus, it 
seems clear that under constitutional law as we now know it, Chae Chan Ping 
should have been allowed to come back to San Francisco. In this way, at least, 
the Chinese Exclusion Case was wrongly decided. 
 But now that the Second Executive Order exempts returning legal resi-
dents, we must face a more difficult question: Was the Chinese Exclusion Act 
constitutional as applied to new immigrants? The legislation was dripping in 
                                                        
38  Ellen Eldridge, CNN Producer Detained in Atlanta Files Lawsuit Against Immigration 
Order, AJC.COM (Feb. 1, 2017, 11:13 AM), http://www.ajc.com/news/crime--law/cnn-pro 
ducer-detained-atlanta-files-lawsuit-against-immigration-order/dWQqxhufKIuOi8W4nsUW 
dM/ [https://perma.cc/T89R-4ZBF]. 
39  Complaint, supra note 5, at 4. 
40  Liz Robbins, U.S. List of Those Detained for Trump’s Travel Ban Is Called Incomplete, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/nyregion/travel-ban-
trump-detained.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/E332-RJ8U]. 
41  Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 2017). 
42  Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 339, 460 (1963). 
43  Id. (“Nor has the Government established that the Executive Order provides lawful per-
manent residents with constitutionally sufficient process to challenge their denial of re-
entry.”). 
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racism, and so the natural impulse is to reach for the Equal Protection Clause. 
But the challenge is not simple. Nationality-based discrimination runs through-
out immigration law.44 To argue against all nationality discrimination in immi-
gration would be ambitious, to say the least.45 Since the passage of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act there has never been a time when the United States had an im-
migration policy based entirely on individualized criteria, with country of citi-
zenship playing no role.  
 The easier (not to say, easy) route is to argue that discriminatory measures 
in immigration are invalid if they are motivated by animus, whether anti-
Chinese racism in 1889 or anti-Muslim prejudice in 2017.46 In the 2017 litiga-
tion, this animus question has been framed through the lens of the Establish-
ment Clause, specifically the requirement that government action must have a 
secular purpose.47 The District Court in Maryland, for example, enjoined the 
second iteration of the travel ban because of “President Trump's animus to-
wards Muslims and intention to impose a ban on Muslims entering the United 
States.”48 
A challenge to the Chinese Exclusion Act would not easily fit within the 
rubric of the Establishment Clause. But essentially the same inquiry into ani-
mus could take place under the Equal Protection Clause, derived primarily from 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Romer v. Evans, where the Court held that even 
under rational basis review a policy would fail equal protection scrutiny if it 
imposed a “broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group” that 
is “inexplicable by anything but animus.”49 The idea that evidence of animus 
                                                        
44  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012) (setting per country limitations on immigration); see al-
so Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitu-
tional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998); cf. Kagan, supra note 32 (the Court 
has been more willing to abandon plenary power with regard to procedural due process than 
substantive constitutional rights). 
45  Cf. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162 (stating alienage distinctions in immigration are “close-
ly connected to matters of foreign policy and national security.”). 
46  Response to Defendants’ Notice of Filing of Exec. Order, supra note 8, at 14 (“[T]he Se-
cond Executive Order are materially indistinguishable from provisions this Court already 
enjoined, and are motivated by the same religious animus as the First Executive Order.”). 
47  See Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 17–00050 DKW–KSC, 2017 WL 1167383, at *5 (D. Haw. 
Mar. 29, 2017) (citing the first prong of the “Lemon test” in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602, 612–13 (1971)).  
48  See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. TDC–17–0361, 2017 WL 1018235, at 
*11–14 (D. Md. Mar. 15, 2017) (applying the Lemon test, and concluding: “These state-
ments, which include explicit, direct statements of President Trump's animus towards Mus-
lims and intention to impose a ban on Muslims entering the United States, present a convinc-
ing case that the First Executive Order was issued to accomplish, as nearly as possible, 
President Trump's promised Muslim ban. . . . These statements [] continue to explain the re-
ligious purpose behind the travel ban in the Second Executive Order.”). 
49  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
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may invalidate policies that otherwise might be permissible has become a key 
feature of equal protection doctrine.50  
 It should be understood that challengers to the executive orders must over-
come two separate hurdles here. First, they must convince the courts that ani-
mus, if proven, would invalidate an immigration restriction. This is probably 
the biggest hurdle, simply because the courts have never had the occasion to 
address it, at least not since the Chinese Exclusion Case. The Ninth Circuit, in 
leaving the injunction against the First Executive Order in place, said that the 
allegations of anti-Muslim animus “raise serious allegations and present signif-
icant constitutional questions.”51 But the Court of Appeals withheld judgment 
on whether animus would in fact invalidate an immigration ban.52  
 The proposition that animus can invalidate an immigration ban attracted 
strong dissents on the Ninth Circuit from Judge Bybee and Judge Kozinski, 
even as the litigation against the second version of the ban was just getting 
started. Judge Bybee argued that an immigration ban is an inherent act of na-
tional sovereignty, and requires deference from the judiciary.53 Judge Kozinski 
added ridicule against the idea that Donald Trump’s anti-Muslim statements as 
a presidential candidate could be used to show his official actions as President 
lacked a secular purpose.54  
These objections call for several responses. 
First, it is curious that Judge Bybee did not mention Zadvydas v. Davis, 
where the Supreme Court in 2001 stated that plenary power over immigration 
is, in fact, limited by the Constitution.55 Judge Bybee based himself primarily 
on much older cases holding that the executive has essentially unreviewable 
power to exclude immigrants. Zadvydas does not directly rebut this claim. It 
dealt directly only with procedural due process for people inside the countr. But 
the decision says that plenary power is limited, and gives no reason why the Es-
tablishment Clause or the Equal Protection could not be invoked. Like DOJ, 
Judge Bybee also makes no mention of the Chinese Exclusion Case, but the gist 
of his argument is that not much has changed since the late nineteenth century 
in terms of judicial scrutiny of immigration policy. 
Second, Judge Kozinski’s emphatic objection to considering statements by 
the President during the campaign may imply a problem for the Trump Admin-
istration. The DOJ is arguing that “courts evaluating a presidential policy di-
rective should not second-guess the President’s stated purpose by looking be-
                                                        
50  Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Postracial Remedies, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 387, 
465–66 (2017). 
51  Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017). 
52  Id. 
53  Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, slip op. at 16–17, 24 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that all that was required to uphold an immigration exclusion is “a facially 
legitimate and bona fide reason,” (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972))).  
54  Id., slip op. at 10–14 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
55  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). 
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yond the policy’s text and operation.”56 Under this view, it hardly seems to 
matter whether the President says “I hate Muslims” during the campaign or 
once in office. Why, then, does Judge Kozinski care whether Donald Trump 
said something as a candidate or in an official capacity? Judge Kozinski’s nar-
rower objection to considering campaign statements hints that perhaps at least 
some statements by the President might be fair game.57 If that is the case, then 
in a sense DOJ will already of lost the normative argument.  
Third, it is revealing that neither Judge Bybee nor Judge Kozinski are will-
ing to argue that an immigration ban could be openly discriminatory against 
Muslims. Nor is the DOJ willing to go quite that far. No one is arguing that the 
President could impose a full-on “No Muslims Allowed” rule. But if the Presi-
dent really has vast authority to exclude classes of immigrants, why not? The 
arguments defending the Trump policies instead are directed at what kind of 
evidence a court should consider to test for animus, and how searching or def-
erential the inquiry should be. This is also an implicit normative concession 
that federal power over immigration really is limited, and judicial scrutiny is 
proper. We are really just arguing, as we so often do in constitutional cases, 
about the proper level of scrutiny.  
 If the animus-based challenges to the Second Executive Order are allowed 
to move forward, the next hurdle would be to actually prove the allegation that 
animus, as opposed to legitimate national security concerns, led to the immigra-
tion ban. The Administration will likely argue that the Second Executive Order 
is not a blanket ban because it allows requests for individual waivers.58 The Se-
cond Executive Order also makes some effort to show a genuine security basis 
for banning immigration from the listed countries.59 The factual inquiry into 
animus would prove an additional opportunity for judges to defer to the execu-
tive branch. A judge could hold that animus is theoretically impermissible, but 
find that the policies might have been enacted even if the President and his ad-
visors had never expressed disapproval of Muslims.60  
 Nevertheless, the mere ability to investigate this would be a significant vic-
tory for opponents of President Trump’s policies.  As Thomas B. Nachbar 
wrote recently, “In the hands of the modern Court, rationality analysis has 
                                                        
56  Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 45. 
57  To be clear, while I may agree that a court should be cautious about mechanically relying 
on rhetorical excess of a campaign, it would seem highly artificial to ignore such statements, 
especially early in a presidential term. Moreover, it is not clear that such a line could ever be 
coherent, since current office holders are also political campaigners. Presidents run for re-
election, governors run for president, and so on. 
58  Second Executive Order, supra note 1, at § 3. 
59  Id., § 1(e). 
60  Cf. Richard Fallon, Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 
555–56 (2016) (“Upon a determination that the legislature had forbidden purposes, the Court 
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turned on its head the traditional refusal of courts to look into legislative moti-
vation, a dramatic development in its own right.”61 
If applicable to immigration, the rule against animus would represent an 
important, though fairly moderate, substantive constitutional limitation on im-
migration policy. It would allow many forms of nationality discrimination, if 
based on neutral criteria, especially when the rules do not impose across-the-
board disabilities on a disfavored class of people. The visa waiver program 
might represent a good example of a nationality-based immigration control that 
could survive an anti-animus rule.62 But an anti-animus rule would likely disal-
low an immigration policy premised on xenophobia—especially the belief that 
people defined by immutable, fundamental characteristics are inherently less 
desirable. 
The question of whether animus can be a part of immigration policymaking 
is urgent. In addition to the travel ban affecting Muslims, the President has 
spent much effort portraying Mexicans as having a propensity for crime.63 Dur-
ing the campaign, a Trump supporter told MSNBC that Mexican culture is 
“causing problems. If you don’t do something about it, you’re going to have 
taco trucks on every corner.”64 As a constitutional matter, can such opinions be 
the motivation for immigration policies? Since throughout history, immigration 
law has often been supported by precisely this kind of popular opinion,65 an an-
ti-animus rule would represent an important turn away from the past. But not 
everyone wants to make this turn.  
CONCLUSION 
President Trump has argued that sovereign nations have an unfettered right to 
choose who should immigrate, including based on cultural assumptions about 
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Warning, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/03/us/politics/taco-
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which groups will be “able to successfully assimilate.”66 The nineteenth century 
Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case expressed similar concern about 
Chinese immigrants: “It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our 
people, or to make any change in their habits or modes of living.”67 While 
many government lawyers appear to be reluctant to cite that case, its reasoning 
seems quite close in many ways to the thinking of our current president. 
The last time the Supreme Court cited the Chinese Exclusion Case was in 
2001. The Court referenced the case only for the narrow proposition that sover-
eign power over immigration is subject to constitutional limits.68 In 2017, the 
Ninth Circuit cited the Chinese Exclusion Case for exactly the same principle.69 
Given the government’s reluctance to cite it, and judges’ recent tendency to 
construe its meaning in favor of constitutional rights for immigrants, it seems 
that there is an implicit understanding that Mr. Chae was wronged. He should 
have been allowed to come home to San Francisco. Thus, the urgent question 
may not be if the Chinese Exclusion Case was wrongly decided, but why. Was 
it merely a problem of procedural due process? Or was Mr. Chae first and 
foremost the victim of impermissible bigotry?  
These questions have been lurking in immigration law for a very long time. 
Up to know, the courts have mostly danced around the edges, leaving much 
ambiguous. But that may not last. President Trump seems intent on finally get-
ting clear answers. After all these years, can we finally, conclusively decide 
whether the Chinese Exclusion Act was constitutional? 
The President needs to know. 
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